Re: A small security feature proposition
- From: "Sourav K. Mandal" <smandal mit edu>
- To: gnome-list gnome org
- Subject: Re: A small security feature proposition
- Date: Sat, 03 Jun 2000 05:05:25 -0400
- From: Sourav K. Mandal <smandal mit edu>
- To: gnome-list gnome org
- Subject: Re: A small security feature proposition
In response to Grzegorz Staniak:
The fundamental issue is that most computer users in the world at
present see computers as appliances, rather than working
environments, though this is certainly changing. People don't need
need graphical utilities to lock the doors of their house at night
before going to bed (though that would be cool), because they deem
it important and go to the trouble. The proposed utility might be
useful in "training" users to care about such things, but in the end
a user must care enough to even push that one widget button;
perhaps, one could set an option by default (unsettable by the user)
in a filemanager to automatically "lock" files and directories
unless explicitly unlocked by the user. Or, one could have a script
installed by default for user shells that rumbles through a user's
home directory and locks certain things on logout.
I think a better strategy overall is to impress upon people the
importance of making backups that are secure and physically separate
from their machine in case disaster strikes (as demonstrated
innumerably by the US State Department). Also, to use "recoverable"
file deletion utilities, like safedelete or delete/undelete, which
can be time-sprung to keep things clean automatically.
In short, things will run much more smoothly (and without bitching)
in the future if "defensive" computer use (like "defensive driving")
is emphasized with the aid of certain tools (like those suggested),
rather than attempting to engage in an arms race with malicious
parties to shield naive users. Playing devil's advocate, what is to
stop a virus from doing a "chattr -i" on everything owned by the
user? Also, many programs, like mail clients, manipulate a number
of files behind the scenes -- would not each program have to follow
this security convention as well?
To summarize, I am stating that user-learned, user-implemented
protection methods, rather than opaque protection services, devices,
programs or program features are the most logical course to
alleviate future mental anguish.
One caveat is that I am simply a long-time Unix user, and no
security expert, so perhaps I have mistaken the depth of Mr.
Staniak's suggestion -- corrections welcome. However, I myself
could not be bothered to lock/unlock files and directories;
account-level security is enough for me, given that I make backups
-- such fine-grain access control is simply too annoying. Perhaps,
a different OS paradigm (e.g. Eros?) based on abstracted
capabilities rather than users could make this less painful for
users and software, and more acceptable "culturally."
Regards,
Sourav Mandal
------------------------------------------------------------
Sourav K. Mandal
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Physics
http://web.mit.edu/smandal/www/
"In enforcing a truth we need severity rather than
efflorescence of language. We must be simple,
precise, terse."
-- Edgar Allan Poe,
"The Poetic Principle"
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